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ENHANCING DRUG EFFECTIVENESS
AND EFFICACY THROUGH
PERSONAL INJURY LITIGATION
Anita Bernstein *
INTRODUCTION
Alarmists spent decades trumpeting the dire effects of
personal injury litigation on the supply of useful prescription
drugs. 1 Their cries used to draw attention with vivid and
specific worries. Imagine a world with no vaccines, they
fretted. 2 Now that pregnant women in the United States have
lost their only drug for morning sickness, more losses are sure

*

Sam Nunn Professor of Law, Emory, and Wallace Stevens Professor of
Law, New York Law School. I appreciate the suggestions and support of
Margaret Berger, Benjamin Zipursky, and Tony Sebok, as well as the careful
attention I received from participants in a Public Law Theory seminar at
Washington University School of Law.
1
Although this paper discusses “prescription drugs,” a category that
Congress legislated in the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, see infra
note 87 and accompanying text, much of its thesis extends also to over-thecounter drugs and medical devices.
2
See, e.g., American Medical Association, Proceedings of the House of
Delegates, 138th Annual Meeting 79 (1988) (deeming liability a serious threat
to vaccine innovation and supply); Paula Jacobi, Pharmaceutical Tort
Liability: A Justifiable Nemesis to Drug Innovation and Access?, 38 JOHN
MARSHALL L. REV. 987, 987 (2005) (quoting headlines about the alarm).
Because the United States is the center of drug research, “the world” might
not be hyperbole. See Victor E. Schwartz & Phil Goldberg, A Prescription
for Drug Liability and Regulation, 58 OKLA. L. REV. 135, 141 (2005)
(describing the vast American pharmaceutical industry with reference to the
size and scope of FDA regulatory efforts).
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to follow. 3 Stifled innovation. Lost cures. Ill health. 4
Legislators and judges responded to the alarm. Vaccines, the
drug category whose supply was most dramatically threatened,
gained protection through federal no-fault legislation in 1986. 5
Twelve years later, Congress banned state-level personal injury
litigation for harms attributed to implanted biomaterials. 6
Several states enacted industry-friendly legislation insulating
drug manufacturers from an array of claims. 7 On the question of
3

MICHAEL D. GREEN, BENDECTIN AND BIRTH DEFECTS: THE
CHALLENGES OF MASS TOXIC SUBSTANCES LITIGATION 336 (1996) (noting
that now that no such drug is available, an increased fraction of pregnant
women have been hospitalized for severe morning sickness); Peter W. Huber,
Safety and the Second Best: The Hazards of Public Risk Management in the
Courts, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 333 n.196 (1985) (quoting from a New
York Times editorial that lamented the downfall of this drug); Jacobi, supra
note 2, at 991 (remarking that this withdrawal was “not an isolated failure”).
4
For a sampling of these works, see William M. Brown, Deja Vu All
Over Again: The Exodus from Contraceptive Research and How to Reverse It,
40 BRANDEIS L.J. 1 (2001); Deborah J. La Fetra, Freedom, Responsibility,
and Risk: Fundamental Principles Supporting Tort Reform, 36 IND. L. REV.
645 (2003); Gregory C. Jackson, Comment, Pharmaceutical Product Liability
May Be Hazardous to Your Health: A No-Fault Alternative to Concurrent
Regulation, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 199 (1992); LOUIS LASAGNA, THE CHILLING
EFFECT OF PRODUCT LIABILITY ON NEW DRUG DEVELOPMENT, in THE
LIABILITY MAZE: THE IMPACT OF LIABILITY LAW ON SAFETY AND
INNOVATION 334, 334-48 (Peter W. Huber & Robert E. Litan eds., 1991).
5
National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, codified at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 300aa-11 (2004).
6
Biomaterials Access Assurance Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-230, §
1, 112 Stat. 1519 (codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1606 (2004)).
7
One strong state law is Mich. Stat. Ann. § 600.2946 (5) (2006), which
eliminates causes of action for defective warning or design when the product
complained about is an FDA-approved drug. See Adam Cohen, They Say We
Have Too Many Lawsuits? Tell It to Jack Cline, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 2007,
Week in Rev., at 11 (declaring that the pharmaceutical lobby pushed this
reform through the Michigan legislature). The statute survived a challenge
based on state constitutional law. Taylor v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., 658
N.W. 2d 127 (Mich. 2003). For examples of narrower legislation, see Cal.
Health & Safety Code § 199.45(n)(3) (West Supp. 2003) (enacted 1986)
(immunizing manufacturers, should any come to exist, from design and
warning liability for HIV vaccines); Schwartz & Goldberg, supra note 2, at
176 n.262 (referring to state statutes providing that compliance with federal
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whether its past approvals of warning language preempt personal
injury actions, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) came
to invert its position, swiveling from support for liability as a
source of safety to a stance that liability threatens supply, 8 and
began to file amicus briefs urging courts to dismiss these claims
based on federal preemption. 9 Some courts have agreed with its
new posture. 10
The initiative to shield prescription drugs from the ravages
of liability developed as a corner of the tort reform battleground.
When the plaintiffs’ side of the struggle worked against this
initiative through the 1980s and into the early years of the new
century, they gave drugs a subordinate place in their fight
against measures to limit liability. Prescription drugs never were
prominent villains to the plaintiffs’ bar. The trial lawyers who
lobbied Congress to dampen federal tort reform and fought
court-closing legislation in the statehouses attacked the insurance
industry, environmental polluters, “corporate greed,” and other
perennials, but did not identify pharmaceuticals as especially
deserving of liability as a sanction. The prescription drug
business caught another break circa 1987, when militants decried
regulatory policy as harmful to the health of HIV-infected
patients. 11 These partisans of regulatory relief identified
regulations establishes a rebuttable presumption that any product, including a
drug, is not defective).
8
Food and Drug Administration, Requirements on Content and Format
of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug and Biological Products, 71 Fed.
Reg. 3922, 2924 (2006). See also DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY
LAW 909-10 (2005) (describing this shift).
9
See Amicus Brief of the United States, Motus v. Pfizer, Inc., 358 F.3d
659 (9th Cir. 2004) (Nos. 02-55372, 02-55498), 2002 WL 32303084; Brief
for Amicus Curiae the United States, Colaccio v. Apotex, Inc., 432 F. Supp.
2d 514 (E.D. Pa. 2006) (No. 05-5500), 2006 WL 1784525.
10
See Goldych v. Eli Lilly & Co., No. 5:04-CV-1477(GLS GJD), 2006
U.S. Dist. Lexis 49616 (N.D.N.Y. July 19 2006); Colaccio v. Apotex, Inc.,
432 F. Supp. 2d 514 (E.D. Pa. 2006).
11
For a short history, see Matthew C. Lovell, Second Thoughts: Do the
FDA’s Responses to a Fatal Drug Trial and the AIDS Activist Community’s
Doubts About Early Access to Drugs Hint at a Shift in Basic FDA Policy?, 51
FOOD & DRUG L.J. 273, 277-78 (1996).
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constraints on the prerogatives of industry as a problem rather
than a solution. With their street-theater flair and dramatic
diction—Silence=Death, Queer Nation, ACT UP (an acronym
for AIDS Coalition to Unleash Power)—AIDS activists could not
be dismissed as tools of the drug-corporate establishment, and
added a little radical chic to an increasingly conservative
consensus.
Over these decades, legal luck would occasionally falter for
the industry. A portion of sales revenues returns to customers as
compensation for their personal injuries. The diet drug phen-fen,
for example, cost its manufacturer more than $16 billion in
payments for cardiac injuries. 12 Harms attributed to Zyprexa, a
drug for schizophrenia and bipolar disorder, generated $1.2
billion in settlement expenses by early 2007. 13 Big Pharma
suffered a blow in 2004 when Vioxx, a one-time market leader,
became discredited and then went on to generate several
multimillion-dollar jury verdicts against its manufacturer, as well
as, alarm within the industry. 14 Drug companies also have paid
fines and civil penalties. 15 To date, however, large setbacks for
pharmaceuticals defendants remain rare and (in relation to
profits and gross sales revenues for the industry) trivial. 16
12

Phen-fen’s Hazards Emerge Anew, Bus. Wire, Mar. 22, 2004,
available at www.lexisnexis.com.
13
Alex Berenson, Lilly Settles with 18,000 Over Zyprexa, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 5, 2007, at C1.
14
The Lessons of Merck’s Bad Day in Court, THE ECONOMIST, Aug. 27,
200. available at www.lexisnexis.com. When Vioxx lost its FDA approval,
every major newspaper in the United States led with the story.
15
The most notorious example involves the epilepsy drug Neurontin. In
2004 its manufacturer, Parke Davis, pleaded guilty to two counts of violating
the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, and agreed to pay a $240 million
criminal fine, the second-largest criminal fine in a health-law prosecution, in
addition to almost $200 million more in civil penalties. Drug Maker to Pay
$430 Million in Fines, Civil Damages, FDA CONSUMER, July-Aug. 2004,
available at http://www.fda.gov/fdac/features/2004/404_wl.html.
16
The California Attorney General noted in an editorial that in 2002
Fortune magazine had ranked the prescription drug industry as “No. 1 in
return on revenues, return on assets and return on equity.” Bill Lockyer,
Prescription Warning, SAN FRAN. CHRON., May 10, 2004, at B7.
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More important, not since the litigation-hastened demise of
the very dangerous Dalkon Shield intrauterine device in 1974 17
has any pharmaceutical product demonstrated that personalinjury liability can be a source of social utility. Take Vioxx as
exemplar of what personal-injury liability has not achieved.
Plaintiffs’ lawyers did not discover its dangers; the drug had
already left the market before a jury verdict came in against it;
increases in talk about improving drug safety policy also had
predated liability for this drug; and personal-injury litigation did
not generate information to benefit the consuming public. 18 Drug
industry leaders may well disapprove of personal-injury liability
as practiced in the United States, and the threat of liability may
still inhibit what they choose to do. 19 But their business has not
suffered much adversity in court.
As for law review commentary, writers divide unequally
between the pro- and anti-liability camps—the former group
“conservative” in the sense of defending a status quo and
“liberal” or “progressive” in favoring plaintiffs over corporate
defendants. 20 Its antagonists on the anti-liability side make
17

The great muckraking journalist Morton Mintz told a devastating story
in AT ANY COST: WOMEN, CORPORATE GREED, AND THE DALKON SHIELD
(1985). See also Kenneth J. Chesebro, Galileo’s Retort: Peter Huber’s Junk
Scholarship, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1637, 1677-79 (1993) (noting the
information-extracting effects of litigation about this product). The Dalkon
Shield was a medical device, not a drug; for liability purposes the two cannot
always be treated alike. See Richard A. Nagareda, FDA Preemption: When
Tort Law Meets the Administrative State, 1 J. TORT L. article 4, 36-37 (2006)
(noting distinctions).
18
See Anita Bernstein & Joseph Bernstein, An Information Prescription
for Drug Regulation, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 569 (2006).
19
On “the shadow of the law,” see Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis
Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88
YALE L.J. 950 (1979); as affecting this industry, see La Fetra, supra note 4,
at 646-54 (arguing that drug innovation and development are deterred by “the
prospect of liability”). But see GREEN, supra note 3, at 339-41 (arguing that
fears of ruinous liability by drug manufacturers and their advocates are
exaggerated).
20
Defenses of prescription-drug liability include JOAN CLAYBROOK,
RETREAT FROM SAFETY: REAGAN’S ATTACK ON AMERICA’S HEALTH (1984);
THOMAS H. KOENIG & MICHAEL L. RUSTAD, IN DEFENSE OF TORT LAW 101
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reform proposals; these commentators have offered a variety of
ideas about how to quell overdeterrence. 21 Some seek to rewrite
negligence doctrine for prescription-drug cases. 22 Others would
exempt a particular sector of the drug industry from tort liability
generally, on the ground that it is too vital to be put in jeopardy
by jury adjudication. 23 Numerous writers argue for a regulatory
compliance defense that would establish FDA approval of drug
design or warning as a shield against liability. 24
(2001); Lucinda M. Finley, Female Trouble: The Implications of Tort Reform
for Women, 64 TENN. L. REV. 847 (1997); and (more equivocally) Teresa
Moran Schwartz, Regulatory Standards and Products Liability: Striking the
Right Balance Between the Two, 30 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 431 (1997).
21
The suggestions surveyed in this paragraph address liability as a
source of overdeterrence that harms the supply of prescription drugs. Another
set of writings sites overdeterrence in the FDA itself, and argues that
Congress or the FDA itself should loosen the agency’s monopoly on drug
regulation. See Elizabeth C. Price, Teaching the Elephant to Dance:
Privatizing the FDA Review Process, 51 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 651 (1996)
(making this argument and summarizing other versions of it); see also
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, OVERDOSE: HOW EXCESSIVE GOVERNMENT
REGULATION STIFLES PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION (2006) (arguing that by
imposing high costs of doing business, pharmaceutical regulation threatens
the supply of new drugs). Other writers go beyond the supply problem and
ascribe more ill effects to prescription-drug liability. See JUDYTH PENDELL,
THE ADVERSE SIDE EFFECTS OF PHARMACEUTICAL LITIGATION, AEIBROOKINGS JOINT CENTER FOR REGULATORY STUDIES, Sept. 2003, at 4-10
(summarizing a range of complaints about the harms of liability, including
that warnings are now written with liability rather than therapeutic benefit in
mind; patients refuse to take a prescribed drug when they have heard a report
of lawsuits about it; and pharmacists over-warn patients).
22
Eleanor M. Fox & Michael Traynor, Biotechnology for Human Life
and Health–The Special Case for a Negligence-Only Rule to Promote Critical
Innovation, 6 HIGH TECH L.J. 1 (1991).
23
See, e.g., Brown, supra note 4 (proposing no-fault scheme for injuries
attributed to contraceptives); Dan L. Burk & Barbara Bozcar, Biotechnology
and Tort Liability: A Strategic Industry at Risk, 55 U. PITT. L. REV. 791
(1994); H. William Smith III, Note, Vaccinating AIDS Vaccine
Manufacturers Against Product Liability, 42 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 207
(1992).
24
David S. Torborg, Comment, Design Defect Liability and Prescription
Drugs: Who’s in Charge?, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 633 (1998) (advocating a
regulatory compliance defense for design claims); W. Kip Viscusi et al.,
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This above-mentioned “variety of ideas” is not varied:
homogeneity and stasis characterize the literature about the
consequences of liability. On the relation between personalinjury litigation and drug supply, the sounds of alarm already
noted—early tocsins like Vaccinelessness is coming! and What
will happen to birth control?—have softened into a more muted
chorus, with almost all singers holding the same industryprotective hymnal. Reminiscent of the courts and legislatures
they study, whose attitudes toward prescription-drug liability
range from militant loathing to indifference, law review writers
typically either condemn this corner of personal injury law or
ignore it. For the condemning cohort, the task of maintaining
criticism grows less urgent but does not end. Shifts of statutory
law and judicial doctrine do not entirely eliminate the risk of
personal injury litigation that faced drug manufacturers in the
years before tort reform, and so it appears to commentators that
the problem of personal injury lawsuits will always be with us.
Stifled innovation, lost cures, and ill health are just what liability
does. The lament has no terminus in sight, no reason to declare
victory and celebrate its successes in altering liability law. As
long as fears of ruinous litigation continue, says the consensus,
the supply of drugs will remain compromised.
One may consider a contrary view on this issue—the quaint
belief, associated with the long-departed Roger Traynor (19001983), who served as chief justice of the California Supreme
Court in the middle of the twentieth century, that litigation
seeking redress for the adverse effects of manufactured products
has good effects on public welfare and safety 25 —without
Deterring Inefficient Pharmaceutical Litigation: An Economic Rationale for
the FDA Compliance Defense, 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 1437 (1994)
(including both design and warning). For a judicious look at the proposal, see
Michael D. Green, Safety as an Element of Pharmaceutical Quality: The
Respective Roles of Regulation and Tort Law, 42 ST. LOUIS L.J. 163 (1998);
for an exploration of alternatives to a regulatory compliance defense that
would advance similar ends of uniformity, see David R. Geiger & Mark D.
Rosen, Rationalizing Product Liability for Prescription Drugs: Implied
Preemption, Federal Common Law, and Other Paths to Uniform
Pharmaceutical Safety Standards, 45 DE PAUL L. REV. 395 (1996).
25
Greenman v. Yuba Power Products Co., 377 P.2d 897, 901 (Cal.
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necessarily rejecting the chorus and its hymns. The posture that
Americans suffer from drug-liability overdeterrence goes
unchallenged in this Article. 26 The question that will get
attention pertains to the other side in the balance. Personalinjury litigation causes harm to the drug industry and its
customers, we shall agree. Does it, or can it, cause good results
as well? Is there a socially useful role for prescription-drug
liability?
In search of social utility—both as it exists at present and the
incremental benefit that might result from law reform—this
Article considers effectiveness, the neglected and undertheorized younger sibling of prescription drug safety. 27 It
recommends that courts deem ineffectiveness an actionable
injury. Courts already extend this recognition when they hear
claims for deceptive practices based on inaccuracy in
pharmaceutical labeling. Yet deception does not cover all the
harm that ineffective drugs cause. An ineffective drug is also a
source of bodily injury. One manageable way to acknowledge
this physical harm would be to permit a plaintiff who suffered
1962); Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 150 P.2d 436, 462-64
(Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concurring); Roger J. Traynor, The Ways and
Means of Defective Products and Strict Liability, 32 TENN. L. REV. 363, 375
(1965).
26
The pro-liability literature, see supra note 20, works at a high level of
generality: dangerous side effects, corporate venality, hurt victims,
inadequate regulation. For a more pointed look at whether prescription-drug
liability enhances the public good, see Paul Rheingold, The MER/29 Story–An
Instance of Successful Mass Disaster Litigation, 56 CAL. L. REV. 116 (1968).
Rheingold, a litigator representing plaintiffs, argues that the defendant
corporation suffered when its stock price dived “disastrously,” id. at 143-44,
and that concerted activity by the lawyers gave injured people more effective
representation. Id. at 147. To this extent, the litigation was successful. But
Rheingold found little or no improvements to the industry, regulators, or the
furnishing of medical care.
27
Safety is already covered in the pro-liability literature, which defends
personal-injury chiefly litigation as a way to protect persons who consume
prescription drugs from dangerous side effects. See supra note 20. Like the
thesis expressed in this paper, these claims of safety-enhancing policy seek to
do some of the work of the FDA. On effectiveness in contrast to efficacy, see
infra Part I.B.
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from a drug’s lack of safety to recover—if and only if she can
prove that the drug did not live up to the claims on its label—for
its ineffectiveness as well. 28
As legal concepts, safety and effectiveness reside in statutory
law: a manufacturer may not sell a drug in interstate commerce
unless the federal government has deemed it safe (per New Deal
legislation, enacted in 1938, which empowered the Food and
Drug Administration to ban the sale of unsafe drugs) and also,
since 1962, effective. Ex ante determinations of safety and
effectiveness are the province of regulation rather than liability
law, but courts recognize the concepts in personal injury
litigation using their own vocabulary: drugs that are not “safe
and effective” in regulatory jargon might also be defective
products, unreasonably dangerous manufactured goods, the
result of a breach of the seller’s duty, and the instantiation of
negligence or strict products liability.
Liability doctrine has long manifested awareness of its
connection to drug safety. The first encyclopedic statement about
prescription drug liability in the United States, Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 402A comment k, published in 1965,
declared that if the benefits of a prescription drug “outweigh its
known risks, and if the manufacturer has provided suitable
warnings and directions for use, the defendant’s product will be
deemed reasonably safe, and the plaintiff will not recover.” 29
Courts that accept this formulation not only immunize

The exact nature of this recovery could take many forms. Time will
need to pass before ineffectiveness becomes accepted among tort lawyers and
judges as a source of physical injury. For beginning steps, this Article
proposes expanding ineffectiveness as a constituent of current doctrine
regarding defect and danger, and as it pertains to punitive damages. See infra
Part III.
29
See Joseph A. Page, Generic Product Risks: The Case Against
Comment k and for Strict Tort Liability, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 853, 855 (1983)
(offering this paraphrase). Comment k is notoriously hard to fathom. Aaron
Twerski, a co-Reporter for the successor Restatement, used to tell his
Products Liability students that anyone in the class who could explain it to
him would get an A. Aaron D. Twerski, From a Reporter’s Perspective: A
Proposed Agenda, 10 TOURO L. REV. 5, 15-16 (1993).
28
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prescription drugs from design-defect liability, 30 a stance for
which some commentary criticizes them, 31 but also equate
design defect with lack of safety, omitting from consideration
the other drug-approval criterion of effectiveness—a judicial
omission about which commentary has been silent. The apt
remark that prescription-drug liability in the United States is all
about warning rather than design 32 also presumes the ascendancy
of safety over effectiveness, because the danger of harmful
effects can be named in a warning much more clearly than the
danger of futility.
In defending the manufacturer-friendly rule they wrote to
govern liability for harms caused by prescription drugs, the
reporters of Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability
claimed that the standard Traynorian rationales about deterrence
and safety incentives do not apply to prescription drugs: unlike
manufacturers of other types of goods, drug manufacturers
cannot sell their products before they receive a government
proclamation of safety and effectiveness, and they reap
extraordinary profits when they can promote their goods as
better than their competitors’. Thus these sellers already “face
adequate incentives to innovate to make drugs better and safer
independently of incentives supplied by tort law.” 33 They will
emphasize safety to hone their competitive edge, because “drugs
that cause serious negative side-effects are especially vulnerable
30

E.g., Brown v. Superior Ct., 751 P.2d 470 (Cal. 1988). See also
Transue v. Aesthetech Corp., 341 F.3d 911, 916 (9th Cir. 2003) (applying
Washington law); Grundberg v. Upjohn Co., 813 P.2d 89, 95 (Utah 1991).
31
George W. Conk, Is There a Design Defect in the Restatement (Third)
of Torts: Products Liability?, 109 YALE L.J. 1087, 1118-27 (2000); Richard
L. Cupp, Rethinking Conscious Design Liability for Prescription Drugs: The
Restatement (Third) Standard Versus a Negligence Approach, 63 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 76 (1994); Page, supra note 29, at 865-67.
32
Michael D. Green, Prescription Drugs, Alternative Designs, and the
Restatement (Third): Preliminary Reflections, 30 SETON HALL L. REV. 207,
209 (1999). See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY
§ 6 cmt. d (1998) (calling warning “the major basis” of liability for
prescription drugs and devices).
33
James A. Henderson, Jr., & Aaron D. Twerski, Drug Designs are
Different, 111 YALE L.J. 151, 179 (2001).

BERNSTEIN.DOC

7/1/2007 10:42 PM

ENHANCING DRUG EFFECTIVENESS

1061

to new alternatives not protected by the patent system.” 34
Though mindful of effectiveness, this view of liability sees
effectiveness as extrinsic to personal injury litigation.
This Article explores the contrary thesis that effectiveness is,
and ought to be, central to personal injury litigation related to
prescription drugs, particularly at a time when neither the
market nor regulation is attaining this social good, its presence
in a strongly worded statute notwithstanding. 35 Part I explores
the rule—on the books now for 45 years yet still extraordinary—
that those who would sell one particular product in interstate
commerce must prove (by “substantial evidence,” no less) that
their product is effective. Though extraordinary, this criterion
for premarketing approval is fixed, very popular, and almost
entirely devoid of controversy. It responds to an enormous
problem: ineffective drugs fill a landscape of calamitous waste
and harm. 36 Among those who suffer from this harm, the
34

Id.
For a remote yet pertinent analogy one might go back again to the
middle of the twentieth century, see supra note 25 and accompanying text,
when civil rights activists, led by Thurgood Marshall, resorted to the courts
not because they wanted to build famous case precedents culminating in
Brown v. Board of Education but because they saw no other cure for
powerlessness, disenfranchisement, and lack of protection from the rule of
law. Their celebrated “litigation strategy” was costly, fatiguing, dispiriting,
and dangerous. JACK GREENBERG, CRUSADERS IN THE COURTS: HOW A
DEDICATED BAND OF LAWYERS FOUGHT FOR THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT
81 (1994). In raising the analogy, I wish to be clear that as a social problem,
ineffectiveness in any consumer product, not just drugs, is inherently suited
less to litigation than the reparative reach of markets, in which the public can
abjure deleterious items, and regulation, which curbs their tendency to injure.
Only because of the inadequacy of these measures in practice does this
Article seek to enlist litigants and judges in the work of demonstrating in
court the connection between drug ineffectiveness and lack of safety. On the
relation between the roughly contemporaneous expansion of tort remedies and
civil rights in the United States, see Anita Bernstein, Muss es Sein? Not
Necessarily, Says Tort Law, 67 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 7, 13 & n. 27 (2004)
(citing Gary T. Schwartz, The Beginning and the Possible End of the Rise of
Modern Tort Law, 26 GA. L. REV. 601, 610-12 (1992)).
36
Maxwell J. Mehlman, Health Care Cost Containment and Medical
Technology: A Critique of Waste Theory, 36 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 778,
35
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Article focuses, at the end of Part I and in more detail in Part
II, on consumers, a group that includes physicians, patients, and
third-party payors. Once the contention about harm is
established, it becomes proper to envision legal remedies for a
wrong recognized in law. The proposals offered at the end of
the Article pay heed to particular players while recognizing that
many more are hurt by ineffective drugs, and many other
remedies for this social ill might exist: Part III addresses trial
judges presiding over actions brought by patients who attribute
injury to the prescription drugs they took. 37
I. WHAT IS AN EFFECTIVE DRUG?
In 1962, the requirement that drugs be effective became
federal law in Section 505 of the Food Drug Cosmetic Act,
which directed the Secretary of what is now the Department of
Health and Services—in practice, the FDA—to withhold
approval of a new drug unless the government has “substantial
evidence” of its effectiveness. 38 This directive raises several
questions. First, what does the effectiveness criterion add to the
older safety criterion for approval? Second, which effects are
784-98 (1986) (depicting “waste” in medical treatments, a category that
includes ineffective drugs, as a problem too large to be solved).
37
For another policy prescription aimed at judges but used for a
different goal, see Schwartz, supra note 4, at 172 (offering a section of
liability-limiting suggestions under the caption “How Courts Should Handle
Prescription Drug Litigation”). Another complementary subject is consumer
fraud litigation for deceptive claims of safety and effectiveness, a cause of
action that one trio of defense lawyers has described as likely to grow more
favored by the plaintiffs’ bar. Joseph J. Leghorn, Christopher Allen, Jr., and
Tavares Brewington, Defending an Emerging Threat: Consumer Fraud Class
Action Suits in Pharmaceutical and Medical Device Products-Based
Litigation, 61 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 519 (2006). Consumer fraud claims are
based on state deceptive-practices statutes, typically do not involve physically
injured plaintiffs, and often include attempts to obtain class certification. See
id. By contrast, this paper looks at effectiveness as a constituent of personal
injury claims and focuses on common law doctrine. See infra part III.
Hewing mostly to state tort law, I do not address class actions, an
increasingly federalized domain.
38
21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (2004).

BERNSTEIN.DOC

7/1/2007 10:42 PM

ENHANCING DRUG EFFECTIVENESS

1063

contemplated in the word “effective”? Third, what classes of
consumers and which of their interests does the statute address?
A. An Extraordinary Mandate
Americans now take the rule for granted, but it remains
remarkable that Congress chose to forbid the marketing of one
particular ineffective product in interstate commerce. Regulation
of consumer products typically seeks to avert acute danger rather
than futility or failure. A banned substance in the United States
is usually a hazardous substance, and at the time of the 1962
amendments, prescription drugs already had to be approved as
safe before marketing. Effectiveness is not entirely alien to
regulation, of course. 39 Nevertheless, in a market economy
effectiveness normally emerges through manifested behaviors—
customers choose; they buy; they come back to buy again—
rather than, so to speak, by prescription.
Critics have long proposed that federal law jettison or
restrict the effectiveness criterion for prescription-drug approval.
Going beyond the libertarian premise that it is wrong to ban the
sale of a thing not known to harm or endanger anyone, they
invoke the public weal, contending that because manufacturers
must produce substantial evidence of effectiveness before the
FDA will approve their new-drug applications, it becomes
plausible to surmise that useful therapies will fail the stringent
test and remain off the market. 40 Moreover, drugs that really are
effective—some powerful enough to save lives—cannot reach
patients’ bodies until years of testing have gone by, and so the
critique posits martyrdom: an unknown number (more than zero)
of dead or very sick people would be alive or healthy today had
39

Licensing to ensure professional competence, for example, might be
seen not only to seek safety for clients but to help give clients satisfactory
affirmative results.
40
Economist Sam Peltzman published his estimates in several papers and
SAM PELTZMAN, REGULATION OF PHARMACEUTICAL INFORMATION: THE 1962
AMENDMENTS (1974). He testified before Congress in 1973 that the nation
was losing more than $450 million per year in gross therapeutic benefits as a
result of the effectiveness criterion. Price, supra note 21, at 654 n.21.
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they received an effective treatment in time.41 Other
commentary that might be labeled libertarian-contrarian suggests
that requiring effectiveness as a condition of sale reduces the
impact of placebos—and a placebo does have an effect of its
own. 42
Contemporary political conditions keep these ideas for
libertarian reform permanently outside the United States Code.
Pharmaceutical companies have been working with, not just
grumbling about, the effectiveness criterion for many years, and
would not embrace the uncertainty of some unknown alternative
standard. They also value the criterion as a barrier to
competitors’ entering their market. 43 Even if manufacturers were
to endorse repeal, the public would resist it. “Safe and effective
drugs” seems to be a winning slogan. The effectiveness criterion
drew enthusiasm in 1962 that went beyond bipartisanship: a
unanimous vote in Congress, hearty support from the consumerminded President Kennedy, and no opposition from the
industry. 44 Today the FDA takes its share of criticism but still
enjoys strong approval ratings—more than two-thirds of

41

Daniel B. Klein & Alexander Tabarrok, Who Certifies Off-Label?,
REGULATION MAGAZINE, Summer 2004, at 60, 63; see also Elizabeth A.
Weeks, Is It Worth the Trouble? The New Policy on Dissemination of OffLabel Drug Use Under the Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act
of 1997, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 645, 662 (1999) (noting that the effectiveness
mandate has added two years to the amount of time it takes the FDA to
approve a new drug application).
42
One health-law scholar explores the placebo effect in the context of
informed consent and concludes that it might be ethical to conceal from one’s
patient that a treatment is a placebo. Kathleen M. Boozang, The Therapeutic
Placebo: The Case for Patient Deception, 54 FLA. L. REV. 687 (2002). The
same reasoning supports a modification of the effectiveness criterion for drug
approval. At present, the FDA interprets “substantial evidence” as requiring,
as a condition for approval, that the manufacturer of a drug demonstrate
clinical effects beyond what a placebo would achieve. See 21 C.F.R.
314.126(b)(2)(i.) (2006).
43
Thanks to David Schoenbrod for telling me so.
44
PHILIP J. HILTS, PROTECTING AMERICA’S HEALTH: THE FDA,
BUSINESS, AND ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF REGULATION 161 (2003); MORTON
MINTZ, THE THERAPEUTIC NIGHTMARE 44-54, 71 (1965).
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Americans hold the agency and its work in high regard 45 —in an
era when both elites and ordinary citizens feel hostile or
skeptical toward federal bureaucracies.46
Judges have interpreted the effectiveness criterion for
approval with some severity, holding that consumers have no
right to partake of drugs not approved as effective. The most
compelling category of plaintiffs to protest this stance would be
terminally ill patients, who can credibly say they are about to
die anyway and so should be allowed an unapproved drug for
whatever effects (perhaps placebo effects) that it might offer. 47
Yet even plaintiffs in this sympathetic group, patients who
wanted a nostrum to treat advanced cancer, were rebuffed in
1979 by a unanimous Supreme Court. 48 Recently the libertarian
effort enjoyed a triumph in the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia, which found that terminally ill patients had a
constitutional right of access to a drug that had passed
preliminary safety studies and had not yet been approved as
effective. 49 However, the triumph was short-lived—the court
45

Rita Rubin, Can Americans Trust Their Medicine?, USA TODAY, Dec.
20, 2004 at A1 (reporting on a survey taken in November 2004, a difficult
time for drug manufacturers and regulators, suggesting 70 percent of
Americans have confidence in the FDA); Hilts, supra note 44, at 235
(reporting consistency of this popularity and noting that in 1995 Newt
Gingrich, then a member of Congress, went down after a misfired attack on
the agency). A 1980s survey identified the FDA as the nation’s second-most
popular federal agency, behind the National Parks Service. Sharon Smith
Holston, FDA Deputy Commissioner for External Affairs, The Value of
Patient’s Perspective in FDA’s Decision Process, speech delivered Nov. 3,
1997, available at http://www.fda.gov/oashi/cancer/value.html.
46
See THOMAS F. BURKE, LAWYERS, LAWSUITS, AND LEGAL RIGHTS:
THE BATTLE OVER LITIGATION IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 13 (2002) (attributing
American litigiousness in part to a national suspicion about bureaucratic
power).
47
One father of a young child who died of cancer after being denied an
unapproved drug treatment makes a poignant case for expanded access in
Michael E. Horwin, Comment, “War on Cancer”: Why Does the FDA Deny
Access to Alternative Cancer Treatments?, 38 CAL. W. L. REV. 189 (2001).
48
United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 551 (1979). The drug
these patients wanted was the notorious Laetrile.
49
Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Von
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vacated the judgment 50 —and so, at least at the moment, the
extraordinary mandate of satisfactory results before marketing
remains in place as far as legislators, regulators, courts, the
drug industry, and most of the American public are concerned.
The mandate suggests a next step for courts to take. Federal
law proscribes the sale of ineffective drugs; courts interpreting
this law declare that consumers have no right to ineffective
drugs. From here, one may infer that when consumers receive
drugs that, unknown to them, are ineffective, they have suffered
an infringement of their rights. The Food, Drug, Cosmetic Act
provides no private right of action for this injury, but furnishing
redress to victims who already have other routes to the courts
would honor their right to drug effectiveness.
B. Effectiveness versus Efficacy
It now becomes necessary to consider what “effective”
means—and also what it might be mistaken to mean. Here we
contrast effectiveness with efficacy; for this purpose the two
nouns are not synonyms. This discussion postpones the concept
of “comparative effectiveness” (also known by similar terms like
“relative efficacy”), which is not present in the four corners of
the statute. 51
Congress wrote an implicit definition of the word “effective”
in the 1962 amendments, declaring that the federal government
must prohibit the sale of any drug if “there is a lack of
substantial evidence that the drug will have the effect it purports
or is represented to have under the conditions of use prescribed,
recommended, or suggested in the proposed labeling thereof.” 52
Eschenbach, 445 F.3d 470, 472, 500 (D.C. Cir. 2006). This action was
financed by the Washington Legal Foundation. Abigail Alliance distinguished
Rutherford on the ground that Laetrile had never received safety approval.
50
Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Von
Eschenbach, No. 04-5350, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 28974, at *1 (D.C. Cir.
Nov. 21, 2006). Additional litigation was pending when this Article went to
press in the summer of 2007.
51
See infra note 59 and accompanying text.
52
21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (2004).
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This meaning of “effective” distinguishes effectiveness from
efficacy. 53 Efficacy refers to the propensity of a drug to achieve
intended, observable clinical improvement, with “improvement”
in turn referring to metrics rather than a feeling of good health.
An anti-hypertensive drug is efficacious if it lowers blood
pressure, even if the patient has no consciousness of
improvement, because (in most cases and ceteris parabus) the
lowering of abnormally high blood pressure is a salubrious
change.
Effectiveness, by contrast, refers to the fit between what
happens to patients and what manufacturers promise on drug
labels. An example of a drug that achieves efficacy but not
effectiveness might be the anti-hypertensive mentioned above,
when it functions to lower blood pressure but not by as many
millimeters as its manufacturer asserts that it will. A drug called
Lovenox, the top-seller in its category (low molecular weight
heparins), provides an example of effectiveness that may or may
not deliver efficacy. Lovenox, the trade name for enoxaparin,
promises to reduce the incidence of deep-vein thrombosis.
Approximately a third of the patients who experience deep-vein
thrombosis go on to experience pulmonary embolism;
approximately a third of the patients who experience pulmonary
embolism die. For most patients, by this reckoning, Lovenox is
an idle substance that does their mortality and morbidity
prospects no good. But it does do what its label says it will do—
reduce the incidence of deep-vein thrombosis—and so in 1993 it
won its FDA-approved effectiveness wings. 54 In the vocabulary
53

Jennifer Kulynych, Will FDA Relinquish the “Gold Standard” for New
Drug Approval? Redefining “Substantial Evidence” in the FDA Modernization
Act of 1997, 54 FOOD DRUG L.J. 127, 132-34 (1999). Although the words
have different meanings, many people use them interchangeably. When the
FDA studied drug effectiveness soon after the passage of the 1962
amendments, for example, it referred to its review as the Drug Efficacy
Study Implementation, even though the object of the study was to see whether
drugs lived up to the promises on their labels.
54
See generally Bruce L. Davidson, Controversies in Pulmonary
Embolism and Deep Venous Thrombosis, 60 AM. FAMILY PHYSICIAN 1269
(1999) (summarizing the history and uses of Lovenox in treating these
conditions).
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of another profession, efficacy invokes a tort-like failure to
achieve improvement, while effectiveness, the codified criterion,
is grounded in an implied-in-law contract between buyer and
seller.
C. The Effectiveness Contract
Identifying the buyer is more complex then identifying the
seller. We know the seller. Since most prescription drugs are
carefully branded, at least during their period of patent life,
identification issues found elsewhere in products liability
conveniently disappear. Identifying the buyer—or, more
precisely, the consumer—is more difficult; one cannot rest with
the Uniform Commercial Code’s definition of a buyer as “a
person that buys or contracts to buy goods.” 55 There are three
categories of drug buyer in the United States, each with its own
mix of expectations regarding effectiveness. 56
1. Three Types of Consumers
Physicians comprise one cohort of consumers. The Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 bestowed on them the
prerogative to direct purchases of prescription drugs. Other
people may swallow drugs or apply them to their bodies, while
yet other people pay for them; but assent from a physician is
necessary to the transaction. For decades, every drug
manufacturer targeted virtually all of its advertising and
promotion to this class of buyers, and today most of this
promotional effort still goes to them.
Patients are the group is usually what commentators have in
mind when they refer to “direct to consumer” marketing or
advertising by drug manufacturers. It is patients who in
physiological terms interact with, use up, or metabolize this
product. The category of patients includes, at one end of a
55

U.C.C. § 2-103(1)(a).
This section summarizes a longer discussion in Bernstein & Bernstein,
supra note 18.
56
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spectrum, passive recipients (e.g., children, emergency victims,
unconscious and mentally incapacitated persons), who receive
drug treatments without their consent, and, at the other end,
highly informed patients who pick out the drug they want first
and seek a prescription second. In the middle of the spectrum
are adults with a say in their drug selection who, to varying
degrees, depend on the advice and discretion of their physicians.
As buyers, few patients pay the official, stated retail price of the
prescription drugs they consume.
Third-party payors include governments (notably Medicaid at
the state level, some federal programs like the Veterans
Administration, and more recently Medicare), insurers, and
some employers that administer health plans. It is they who best
fit the U.C.C.’s “contracts to buy” definition of a buyer, as they
do most of their drug purchasing in bulk and, unlike physicians
and patients, are positioned to negotiate terms with the seller.
Third-party payors use formularies as a principal costcontainment device. 57 Formularies, which in pharmacology are
lists “of pharmaceutical substances along with their formulas,
uses, and methods of preparations,” 58 are for third-party payors
databases that tell them which drugs to prefer for the treatment
of which conditions.
2. Effectiveness as Consumers Seek It
All three categories of consumers want prescription drugs to
be both safe and effective; each has a slightly different set of
desires. For physicians, safety is paramount. Their professional
oath exhorts them to do no harm, rather than to achieve results.
57

For an expression of squeamishness on this point from one formulary
authority, see Association of Managed Care Pharmacies, Format for
Voluntary Submissions iv (Apr. 2005), available at http://www.fmcpnet.org/
data/resource/Format~Version_2_1~Final_Final.pdf (“Users should always
keep in mind that the Format [to be used by formulary writers] is not a costcontainment device but an analytic tool to improve the value of health care
delivered.”).
58
THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
(4th ed. 2000).
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Physicians value safety higher than effectiveness: in their
perspective, futile treatments can be scrapped and supplanted in
a trial-and-error effort, but dangerous effects can at best be
mitigated, never undone. For patients, the two adjectives are of
more equal weight. Since they are suffering from the vexations
of a pathological condition more directly than physicians, they
may value effectiveness more than safety.
Third-party payors introduce another priority to the mix:
they are especially keen on comparative effectiveness. 59 Because
they deal with large numbers of patients, they regard
prescription drugs in the aggregate rather than as a tailored
response by one provider to benefit one individual. In this
respect this buyer-consumer is more like the seller than are the
other two consumers. Both manufacturers and third-party
payors, as businesses, focus on revenue: “sales” for the
industry, “cost” for the payors. Both are relatively uninterested
in limited-marked “boutique” products to treat rare conditions. 60
The action, as far as both manufacturers and third-party
payors are concerned, is in products that reach millions of
patients with chronic conditions: drugs to lower cholesterol and
blood pressure and blood sugar; drugs for mental illnesses that
are either very common (such as depression) or relatively
common and very costly not to treat (schizophrenia, bipolar
disorder); painkillers; asthma treatments; palliatives for gastric
symptoms; and industry Holy Grails (an HIV vaccine, a drug
that would safely let people eat whatever they want without
gaining weight). For manufacturers, such drugs pour profits into
their bottom line. For the third-party payor, they are what its
physicians and patients feel entitled to receive and what it too
sometimes has an incentive to want: a good drug can improve a
payor’s bottom line, perhaps by reducing hospital stays or
permitting a patient to work more productively. The third-party
payor knows it has to buy such drugs. But not all of them, as if
59

Although “comparative efficacy” would be a more precise locution,
see supra Part I.B., this Article uses “comparative effectiveness” because it
is more familiar.
60
See generally Bernstein & Bernstein, supra note 18 (elaborating on
this discussion of expectations).

BERNSTEIN.DOC

7/1/2007 10:42 PM

ENHANCING DRUG EFFECTIVENESS

1071

they were all exactly like others in their class. When good
generic substitutes are available, a payor would prefer them to a
patented product. When generics are unacceptable, or not
available, the payor choosing among brands wants the best bang
for its buck.
Everyone, to be sure—even manufacturers—welcomes safety,
effectiveness, and comparative effectiveness; these three desires
are noted not so much to separate each buyer from the other two
as to introduce the third desideratum. Although comparative
effectiveness is not mentioned as a criterion for approval in the
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, increasingly the federal and
state governments have been pursuing it as policy. 61 Times have
changed since 1962: back when Congress passed the
effectiveness amendments, far fewer drugs were available, and
the rise of competitive markets to treat particular conditions had
not yet been envisioned. 62 In the twenty-first century, for
example, a prescriber must strain to think of tricyclic drugs as
“effective” for depression, notwithstanding their decades-old
undisturbed approval under the effectiveness criterion, because
competitor drugs, especially selective serotinin reuptake
inhibitors, work so much better. This space in the effectiveness
contract—between what regulators understand to be the law
governing premarketing approval and the sets of expectations
and entitlements that develop around a statute—is amenable to
input from the courts.
Effectiveness as customers seek it, in sum, includes both
halves of the effectiveness/efficacy division: customers want
drugs to live up to the promises on their labels, and they want
improved therapeutic outcomes. “Improved,” in their view,
relates not only to a patient’s antecedent physiological state but
also to what alternative treatments would deliver. Although
judicial competence is more pertinent to the first desire
(“effectiveness”) than the second (“efficacy”), judges can help

61

Id.
Robert D. Reischauer, Prescription Drug Coverage and Medicare,
Sept. 28, 1999, available at http://www.brookings.edu/views/testimony/
reischauer/19990928.htm.
62
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to fulfill both.

63

C. The Judicial Role in Determining or Ensuring that Drugs
are Effective
In contrast to its approach to safety, 64 the judiciary has
delineated a narrow role for itself with respect to drug
effectiveness. Judges interpreting state law governing personalinjury claims do not consider effectiveness, manifesting a belief
that in their courtrooms litigants are entitled to drug safety but
not the other criterion for drug approval. Judges interpreting
federal statutes deal with effectiveness only as a matter of
administrative law, reviewing agency actions.
1. Inside the Beltway
The unavailing claim in United States v. Rutherford by
patients seeking access to a drug not approved 65 fits in a wider
jurisprudence of federal courts disinclined to enforce the
effectiveness mandate of Section 505. In its stated rights of
action, the statute recognizes only a manufacturer’s appeal from
the denial of a new drug application: 66 following such a denial,
a manufacturer will in some circumstances have a right to a
hearing. 67 The court that holds appellate power over federal
administrative decisions, the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia, has expressed unwillingness to hear
effectiveness-related claims from consumers. 68

63

See infra Part II.A.
See supra text accompanying notes 29-32.
65
See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
66
21 U.S.C. § 355(h) (2004).
67
Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott & Dunning, 412 U.S. 609 (1973)
(cautioning that in order to be entitled to a hearing, the manufacturer must
have submitted evidence of effectiveness).
68
Cutler v. Hayes, 818 F.2d 879, 889 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (holding that
consumers have only very limited standing to compel the FDA to complete a
mandated study of the effectiveness of over-the-counter drugs).
64
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Toward an Entitlement to Effectiveness, Enforced in
Federal and State Courts

Away from the regulatory-review docket of the D.C.
Circuit, courts have not yet confronted the question of whether
individuals who allege injuries that they attribute to prescription
drugs may seek redress for ineffectiveness as well as lack of
safety. Consumers who use state-level deceptive practices
legislation to contend that promises of effects constituted
deception have had mixed results in court. 69 The litigant
envisioned in this Article is a different type of consumer, one
bringing a tort-based claim of negligence or strict products
liability against a drug manufacturer for physical injuries. Our
plaintiff ascribes her injury to the deficient design or warning
that the drug manufacturer chose.
Defects in warning and design equate to lack of safety; in
our scenario, the plaintiff objects to lack of effectiveness as
well. Although a litigant who suffered a physical injury from a
drug is a patient rather than a physician or a third-party payor,
this claim of injury necessarily includes harms to the other two
types of consumer: a physician’s opportunity to practice
medicine satisfactorily is impaired by ineffective drugs, and any
third party who bought this drug received poorer value than
what it sought. The patient-plaintiff should not receive
compensation for injuries to these consumers, of course; they
are not present as parties. A judge should, however, remember
the nonparties when reflecting on the overdeterrence chorus with
which we began. As buyers who participate in sales of this same
good, they too suffered the injury of ineffectiveness of which the
plaintiff complaints. If this type of litigation tends to ameliorate
the harms of ineffective drugs, then these nonparties would
benefit accordingly.
Our judge might raise doubts at this point. Does
ineffectiveness really inflict personal injury? Even if it does,
would recognition of an effectiveness-based claim in a personal
69

See Leghorn et al., supra note 37 (summarizing results, from a
manufacturer’s perspective).
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injury action usurp the functions of Congress and the FDA by
arrogating to the judiciary a subject that Congress has claimed
for itself and assigned to regulators? These questions are taken
up in the next part. Part II answers the first with a resounding
Yes—and this affirmative, a conclusion about gross rather than
net injury, is undiminished by evidence that the effectiveness
criterion hurts consumers; 70 regulation can do good and harm at
the same time. 71 Part III answers No to the second question, and
recommends modifications of existing doctrine to articulate a
role for courts in enforcing drug effectiveness.
II. SOME HARMS TO CONSUMERS CAUSED BY INEFFECTIVE,
COMPARATIVELY INEFFECTIVE, AND INEFFICACIOUS DRUGS
Judicial clinging to metaphors of absence and inaction—the
dog that didn’t bark, 72 the gun that didn’t go off 73 —to describe a
drug that fails to achieve clinical improvement, or to honor the
promises on its label, will leave undisturbed the current
understanding about the incompetence of personal-injury law to
enhance drug effectiveness. The conventional divide will endure.
Product safety versus products liability, ex ante versus ex post,
70

See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
Airline deregulation lowered prices and took away legroom.
Professional monopolies protect clients and raise fees. Zoning laws make
residences homier at the price of lost freedoms. Government-mandated
disclosures to investors convey information and tedium in the same
document.
72
In the famous colloquy between a Scotland Yard detective and
Sherlock Holmes:
“Is there any other point to which you would wish to draw my
attention?”
“To the curious incident of the dog in the night-time.”
“The dog did nothing in the night-time.”
“That was the curious incident.”
ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE, SILVER BLAZE (1892), available at
http://www.classic-literature.co.uk/silver-blaze/.
73
Celia Wren, Chekhov’s Plays, COMMONWEAL, May 3, 1996, at 18
(referring to the famous dictum that “a gun hanging on the wall in the first
act of a play must fire before the close of the final scene”).
71
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regulation versus adjudication, prevention of harm versus
remedy of harm: in this view, effectiveness and efficacy have no
place in court. Regulators should continue to apply the statutory
effectiveness criterion to new-drug applications, and when drugs
prove unsafe in use—when they hurt someone—then liability will
bring in its labels: defect, unreasonably dangerous, strict
liability, negligence, failure to warn. “Ineffective,” as seen here,
is not found in the liability lexicon.
This view is misguided: ineffectiveness, in this respect just
like lack of safety, harms drug consumers. The stance that
regulatory compliance does not immunize manufacturers from
liability—still in place around the country except where the odd
state legislature has installed a change—indicates that packaging
their drugs consistent with FDA decrees for the label also should
not give them immunity. Whether or not harms attributable to
ineffectiveness ought to be actionable in the courts, they exist,
and deserve consideration in any contemplation of the judicial
role in remedying ineffectiveness.
A. Pathologies Unaddressed
The notion that drugs lacking in safety cause injury and
drugs lacking in efficacy do nothing fails to reckon with the
reason drugs are manufactured, prescribed, and ingested: to alter
the body, pursuant to a determination that such an alteration is
necessary to ameliorate or prevent a pathological state. Injury is
the condition against which a drug acts. When the drug does not
do what its label promises, or does not make the patient better
off, then the patient suffers from, at a minimum, whatever
remains of the underlying condition the drug was supposed to
fix. 74 In this sense the drug is responsible for some portion of
the patient’s injury, comparable to the way tort law holds some
74

One litigant who before his death sought access to an unapproved
drug, Joel Oppenheim, reported “dangerous and damaging” effects from
approved, conventional treatments. Abigail Alliance for Better Access to
Developmental Drugs v. Van Eschenbach, 469 F.3d 129, 134-35 (D.C. Cir.
2006); see also Horwin, supra note 47 (reporting the travails of the author’s
son).
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defendants responsible under negligence doctrine for physical
injuries that they did not actively inflict if they had a duty to act
affirmatively to protect or rescue plaintiffs and did not fulfill this
duty.
To continue the analogy from negligence law, one exception
to the common law rule of no duty to rescue another person
arises from an undertaking. A defendant who ordinarily would
have no obligation to benefit the plaintiff acquires this obligation
through affirmative conduct, and becomes liable for injuries
resulting from the failure to act. 75 Prevailing plaintiffs usually
establish that “undertaking” defendants in effect fended off
alternative sources of help, leaving them isolated and dependent
on this solitary source of rescue. Because prescription drugs
consumed by patients have prevailed in a competition, they too
are not inert in the mode of a dog that doesn’t bark. Sellers put
their products forward as interventions. They displaced at least
one alternative—to do nothing—and for most medical conditions
also prevailed over nonpatented treatments and competitor
pharmaceuticals.
Here the gap between efficacy, or clinical improvement, and
effectiveness, understood by American regulatory law to mean
different enough from a placebo in response rates to support a
promise on a label, becomes vivid. Few drugs are efficacious.
When a senior executive of the biggest pharmaceuticals company
in Britain said publicly in 2003 that “most prescription
medicines do not work on most people who take them,” 76 his
remark came across as both a “gaffe” and the telling of “an
open secret.” 77 Drugs for Alzheimer’s disease work for fewer
than one in three patients. Cancer drugs work for fewer than
one out of four. Drugs for migraines, osteoporosis, and arthritis
are more efficacious, working about half the time. The best
antidepressant drugs help about two-thirds of patients, but some
large fraction of the group that enjoys improvement, perhaps 3075

See generally DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 860-69 (2001)
(detailing this basis of liability for physical injury).
76
Steve Connor, Glaxo Chief: Our Drugs Do Not Work on Most
Patients, THE INDEP., Dec. 8, 2003.
77
Id.
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50 percent, would have done as well with placebos. 78
Unsatisfactory compliance by patients accounts for some of the
disappointing results, but experts ascribe more of the failure to
genotypes: many patients do not benefit because they are
physically incapable of responding to even “effective” drugs. 79
At first blush, this gloomy story about lack of efficacy in
practice might support more despair than reformist energy. After
all, if manufacturers, physicians, and patients, all amply
motivated to sell and buy the best drugs, do not achieve
improvement through pharmaceutical intervention, what can
personal-injury doctrine do? Still, the efficacy record shows
opportunity as well as failure. Judges who contribute to even
small gains in drug efficacy would make relatively large changes
to the policy landscape, because the quantity of actual clinical
improvement is small. Improving effectiveness is only one step
away, as the promise that a manufacturer wants most to make on
its label is one of likely clinical improvement. Bringing efficacy
and effectiveness into the personal-injury courtroom would also
help to clarify and expound on the useful distinction between the
two words. Efficacy may remain elusive, given the limitations of
even a mighty industry, but effectiveness will get better after
courts do more to encourage accuracy in labeling; and the need
for accuracy holds promise for improving research and
development.
B. Money Wasted
We return to cost-effectiveness and comparative
effectiveness, concerns that preoccupy everyone who pays for
prescription drugs, especially third-party payors. Most of the
time, anyone buying medications will want to get the maximum
clinical improvement for the minimum expenditure, or at least
will consider cost as a variable. 80 This desire underlies
78

Joe & Teresa Graedon, Some Prescription Drugs Don’t Work as
Advertised, AUGUSTA CHRON., Jan. 13, 2004, at D2.
79
Connor, supra note 76.
80
Commentators make this point while contending that the effectiveness
criterion is obsolete in the managed-care era. See Note, FDA Reform and the
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formularies, the drug-selecting apparatus already mentioned. 81
The premise behind formularies is that a third-party payor
will waste a significant amount of money if it does not consider
cheaper alternatives to whichever drug that someone else who
doesn’t have to pay the price—a patient, a prescribing physician,
a promotion-minded manufacturer—suggests to them that they
buy. 82 The premise appears sound. According to a 1998 study,
physicians write 30 million prescriptions a year for ineffective
drugs in Britain, wasting more than £100 million of National
Health Service money. 83 No comparable “wastestimate” exists
for the United States, which lacks a solitary payor comparable to
the British NHS, but simple extrapolation from American drug
futility generally—the high failure rate of drugs 84 multiplied by
its much larger population—suggests a figure many times
higher. 85
This aspect of harm receives only partial expression by
plaintiffs in personal-injury litigation. Patients who ingest drugs
without clinical improvement, along with their families, may
European Medicines Evaluation Agency, 108 HARV. L. REV. 2009, 2019-23
(1995) (arguing that in contrast to 1962, today managed-care organizations
have incentives to enforce effectiveness); Henry I. Miller, Vaccine
Development a Casualty of Flawed Public Policy, Hoover Institution Weekly
Essays, May 5, 2003, available at http://www.hoover.stanford.edu/
pubaffairs/we/2003/miller05.html (arguing that managed-care organizations
will not support an ineffective vaccine).
81
See supra notes 57-58.
82
Ironically, third-party payors can achieve comparable waste by
refusing to consider a more expensive drug. International donors operating in
Africa have refused to buy an extremely effective antimalarial drug,
artemisinin-combination therapy or ACT, because chloroquine-derived drugs
are cheaper, even though evolution has now rendered chloroquine almost
useless in combating malaria. Cynthia Scharf, Op-Ed, There is a Drug that
Works: A Matter of Money Against Malaria, INT’L HERALD TRIB., July 21,
2004, at 8.
83
Millions Spent on ‘Ineffective Drugs,’ BBC News, Oct. 27, 1998,
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/health/202251.stm.
84
See supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text.
85
Britain does have a more lenient effectiveness criterion for
premarketing approval, however. See FDA Reform and the European
Medicines Evaluation Agency, supra note 80, at 2014.
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feel cheated or that they have wasted their money, but most of
the loss attributed to the waste is not theirs. 86 Furthermore, to
the extent that ineffectiveness (and inefficacy) are the patients’
own fault (they may have unreasonably failed to comply with a
drug regimen, for example), they will seldom suffer a financial
penalty in the way that contributory negligence reduces a
plaintiff’s compensation. Empowering plaintiffs to recover for
drug ineffectiveness (or inefficacy), then, cannot restore the
amount of money wasted on ineffective and inefficacious drugs.
It would, however, force manufacturers to internalize part of the
loss that they created.
C. Unnecessary Toxic Effects
In the 1938 Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act—the first federal
law that referred to limited-sale “prescription” drugs that only a
physician could choose 87 —Congress made safety a condition for
approval by the FDA. The reason for this new safety mandate?
Lack of safety, inherent in the category, and incapable of
elimination: prescription drugs are those drugs with “toxicity or
other potentiality for harmful effect” that renders them “not safe
except under the supervision of a practitioner licensed by
law.” 88 Further recognizing that danger is a sine qua non of all
prescription drugs, the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act has never
purported to define safety as an aspect of drugs, even though in
1962 Congress went on to say much about what it means for a
drug to be effective. The Food and Drug Administration,
moreover, does define safety in its regulation of other products.
For example, food additives may not be sold unless regulators
find “reasonable certainty that no harm will result” from their

86

See supra Part I.C.1 (noting that few persons pay more than a token
share of the stated retail price of prescription drugs they consume).
87
The category of prescription drugs was formally codified later in the
Durphy-Humphrey Amendment to the FDCA. Act of Oct. 25, 1951, 65 Stat.
648 (1951) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 353(b) (2004)).
88
Act of June 25, 1938, ch. 675, § 503, 52 Stat. 1051, codified at 21
U.S.C. § 353 (2004).
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consumption. 89 Applied to prescription drugs, such a definition
of safety would shipwreck the industry.
All prescription drugs are dangerous, then. The only way to
regard them as “safe” is to take into account the good they do:
their efficacy and effectiveness. 90 Seen this way, ineffective
drugs are (once again) not an inert gun that didn’t fire, but a
source of statistically certain danger to patients without an offset
of purposefully obtained therapeutic gain.
D. Emotional Distress
Just as commentary about the effect of liability on
prescription drugs has been one-sided, focusing on
overdeterrence to the exclusion of other policy consequences,
the jurisprudence of the effectiveness criterion as a source of
emotional distress has lamented only the dolor of drugs withheld
from the market. In the literature on the effectiveness criterion,
for example, AIDS activists are found sharing their grief and
rage over lack of access to therapies. 91 A father mourns his dead
son, to whom the FDA said it would give a particular
unapproved drug only after conventional treatment failed—too
late. 92
Lack of efficacy and lack of effectiveness also cause
emotional distress. Patients who take a drug that turns out,
without warning, to lack efficacy have reason to lament lost
opportunities. To some degree they share this unhappiness with
medical providers and third-party payors. Whatever underlying
pathologies called for clinical intervention have not gone away,
and whatever hopeful comfort patients took from the prescribing
of new drugs must end when they learn the truth about futility.
89

21 C.F.R. § 170.3(i) (2004).
Richard A. Merrill, The Architecture of Government Regulation of
Medical Products, 82 VA. L. REV. 1753, 1764 (1996).
91
See Jay Branegan, An Uproar Over AIDS Drugs, TIME, Apr. 6, 1987;
Holston, supra note 45 (recalling the “wrenching experience” of working
inside the FDA in the 1980s when activists, in a “furious outburst,”
demanded “immediate access to unapproved therapies”).
92
See supra note 47.
90
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Because of this blow to their optimism, they are now worse off
than they were back when they had only the pathological
condition and no prescription-drug treatment history for it. Some
patients have the temperament or circumstance (stoicism,
religious faith, perversity) to ease this blow: but it appears
reasonable to associate distress with disappointment on matters
of one’s health. We have noted that effectiveness, the fulfillment
of promises made on a drug’s label, sets up a contract-like
relation between buyer (patient, physician, or third-party payor)
and seller. Contract doctrine generally withholds redress for
emotional distress, but recognizes that breached contracts can in
fact cause this injury, and permits recovery when “the breach is
of such a kind that serious emotional disturbance was a likely
result.” 93
Distress derived from inefficacy and ineffectiveness is
manifest in case law, if one is willing to look for it. Although
plaintiffs can seldom recover when unsafe drugs cause them
emotional distress without objective symptoms of physical harm,
the cases show that many patients attribute fear, anxiety, grief,
and intense unhappiness to encounters they had with prescription
drugs and their close analogue, prescription medical devices. 94
These emotions turn up in judicial opinions even though the
safety-focused personal injury doctrine emphatically does not
want to hear about them. Drug-effectiveness law wants to hear
93

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 353 (1981).
For unsuccessful claims, see Payton v. Abbott Labs, 437 N.E. 2d 171
(Mass. 1982) (denying recovery to DES-exposed plaintiffs who had not yet
developed adenosis or adenocarcinoma); Friedman v. Merck & Co., 107 Cal.
App. 4th 454 (2003) (denying recovery to a strict vegan who became
distraught when he learned that, contrary to assurances, the tuberculosis test
he had taken contained animal products). A rare success story for plaintiffs
was litigation over a defective heart valve, recalled in 1985 because of its
propensity to fracture. In 1993 the manufacturer, Shiley, paid confidential
settlements to 260 plaintiffs for their emotional distress. See DAVID G.
OWEN, JOHN E. MONTGOMERY, & MARY K. DAVIS, PRODUCTS LIABILITY
th
AND SAFETY: CASES AND MATERIALS 682-83 (4 ed. 2004) (also citing
Bravman v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 984 F.2d 71 (2d Cir. 1993), which
allowed an emotional-distress claim over a different heart valve that made
loud noise, audible at 30 feet).
94
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them even less. A reversal of this stance would bring to case
law extended accounts of regret, frustration, resentment,
pessimism about the possibility of relief, and anxiety about lost
opportunities that were always present, but suppressed under
doctrine that refused to recognize them.
III. A PARTIAL CURE IN THE COURTS
What can courts do, in the context of personal injury
litigation, to enforce a consumer entitlement to effectiveness as
well as safety? 95 The suggestions offered here rest on Part I’s
understanding of effectiveness and the consumers who hold
expectations about it. Like other discussions of drug
effectiveness, they include references to efficacy and
comparative effectiveness, yet also maintain the Food Drug and
Cosmetic Act’s implicit definition of effectiveness as living up to
promises on a label. 96
At present, deceptive-practices statutes and common law
fraud provide redress for those instances of ineffectiveness that
reach the level of deceit, but do not explicitly connect
ineffectiveness with physical injury. Subparts A and B below
suggest ways for courts to recognize this connection. The
implicit conception of standing used there (and also in Subpart C
infra, which advocates robust punitive damages), envisions
plaintiffs who already have good claims of failure to warn, or
perhaps for design defect, against drug manufacturers: that is to
say, they have suffered physical injuries suggesting that drugs
lack safety. Claims of lack of effectiveness as well as of the
more familiar safety claims become available in such actions,
95

The focus on state law in this article, see supra note 37, does not
neglect federal judges. Pursuant to diversity jurisdiction they hear drug injury
cases, see supra note 10 (noting two FDA preemption cases in federal court
interpreting Pennsylvania and New York Law), and for non-diversity cases,
federal common law may be available, Erie notwithstanding. See Geiger &
Rosen, supra note 24, at 422-27 (observing that federal common law “still
flourishes” to implement federal statutes, and that the Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act is well suited to this type of common law).
96
See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
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and thus amenable to adjudication, when judges accept any of
the following shifts in doctrine.
A. Mandate Information about the Comparative Record,
Using Failure to Warn Doctrine
Because personal-injury liability for injuries caused by
prescription drugs centers around failure to warn, anyone who
seeks to change the outcomes of drug-liability litigation will
begin with the law of warning. Products liability law relies on
warning as a means to make users’ encounters with products less
dangerous. A manufacturer must use reasonable care in the
design and fabrication of its products and then, to the extent
foreseeable dangers remain, warn users. In principle, warnings,
which can convey advice on how to use a product safely and
whether to reject it altogether, 97 keep to a minimum the effects
of dangers that cannot be eliminated through improved design. 98
Applied to cases where defendants sold their product with a
warning—all personal-injury claims for drug-caused harms fall
in this category, because FDA regulations look closely at
packaging and compel sellers to submit proposed words for preclearance before marketing—doctrine focuses on its “adequacy”
or “sufficiency.” The leading case on adequate warning,
Pavlides v. Galveston Yacht Basin, Inc., 99 identifies an
obligation of the seller to communicate to the consumer what he
or she would reasonably want to know about risks. That for
most prescription drugs manufacturers discharge their duty by
warning a “learned intermediary” between them and the
97

James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Doctrinal Collapse in
Products Liability: The Empty Shell of Failure to Warn, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV.
265, 285 (1991) (distinguishing between “risk reduction” and “informed
choice” warnings).
98
For a trenchant reminder to courts that, notwithstanding § 402A of the
Second Restatement, warnings should insulate manufacturers from liability
only when the dangers could not have been eliminated by reasonable
redesign, see Howard Latin, “Good” Warnings, Bad Products, and Cognitive
Limitations, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1193 (1994).
99
727 F.2d 330 (5th Cir. 1984).
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patient—that is, the patient’s physician—does not alter the need
for adequacy.
The current Restatement states the duty to warn concisely:
“A prescription drug or medical device is not reasonably safe
due to inadequate instructions or warnings if reasonable
instructions or warnings regarding foreseeable risks of harm are
not provided” to “prescribing and other health-care providers”
or patients directly, depending on the context.100 Because safety
is a context-driven condition, bound up with effectiveness—even
a small risk is too much when the drug is absolutely
ineffective—and because no prescription drug is perfectly safe,
this black-letter necessarily takes effectiveness into account. And
whenever consumers have more than one treatment to choose
from, effectiveness cannot be divorced from comparisons with
the drug’s alternatives.
To put the point within traditional warning doctrine, a
crucial element of an adequate warning is communication about
the consequences of not heeding it. Warnings are messages
about choice. The risk reduction category of warning says,
“When you use our product, consider the following concurrent
precaution, for the following reason.” Warnings in the other
category, informed choice, give users what they need to know as
they decide between abstention and engagement. Although an
implicit comparator is present also in the risk reduction
category, informed choice is the central reason to tell consumers
about alternatives.
The FDA, acting perhaps out of its mistaken belief that drug
regulators considering a new drug application have no authority
under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act to consider what
comparators offer, 101 has not ordered manufacturers to provide
100

RESTATEMENT (THIRD)

OF

TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 6(d)

(1998).
101

Lars Noah, Medicine’s Epistemology: Mapping the Haphazard
Diffusion of Knowledge in the Biomedical Community, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 373,
437 (2002) (noting FDA resistance to regulating drug comparisons). See also
Mehlman, supra note 36, at 788 (observing that the FDA almost never
withholds approval on the ground that a drug is inferior to “an alternative
already on the market”).
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this comparative information to consumers. 102 The lost
opportunity has led to a comprehensive and fundamental
deprivation, so complete that reformers have had trouble
imagining repair. In a moment of what he called “wishful
thinking,” 103 physician-pharmacologist Jerry Avorn wrote two
sentences that manufacturers could tack onto the label of most
newly approved drugs, if they were inclined to tell the whole
truth: “This new medication has not been shown to be any better
than currently available products, and has a much more limited
safety record. There is no evidence that its higher price is
accompanied by any demonstrated therapeutic advantage.” 104
While regulatory politics in Washington prevent the FDA
from demanding that much candor about the effectiveness of a
drug before approval, judges who interpret and apply the
common law duty to warn remain free to determine that silence
about alternatives withholds from consumers information to
which they are entitled. The law of preemption does not block
this stance: most courts agree that the Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act does not preempt claims against pharmaceutical
manufacturers for warning defects in prescription drugs, and
maintain that “drug labeling regulations generally impose only
minimum standards—these regulatory provisions provide merely
a safety floor—and state tort law beneficially supplements
federal regulatory efforts to promote drug safety.” 105 Although
the FDA announced in 2006 by preamble its view that agency
approval of labeling preempts failure-to-warn claims, 106 this
view is not entitled to deference from judges. 107 States may, if
102

Bernstein & Bernstein, supra note 18.
JERRY AVORN, POWERFUL MEDICINES 365 (2004).
104
Id.
105
Owen, supra note 8, at 909.
106
Food and Drug Administration, Requirements on Content and Format
of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug and Biological Products, 71 Fed.
Reg. 3922, 2924 (2006).
107
See Perry v. Novartis Pharma. Corp., 456 F. Supp. 2d 678 (E.D.
Pa. 2006) (so holding with respect to a suit in which the FDA had filed an
amicus brief). See also Timothy Ardizzone, Comment, The FDA: Advocate
or Regulator of the Pharmaceutical Industry? The Attempted Preemption by
103

BERNSTEIN.DOC

1086

7/1/2007 10:42 PM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

they wish, enact statutes that impose a contrary pro-preemption
stance. 108 The majority of them do not constrict their common
law by this means. Courts construing the law of most states thus
may deem a warning inadequate even if the FDA approved it.
Congress and state legislatures, in sum, have given federal and
state judges latitude to set warning standards high enough to
include the comparative information that the FDA did not
demand.
Regarding the content of this missing information about
comparative treatments, the phrase “informed choice” continues
instructive. Different consumers have differing needs to be
informed about the relative merits of each drug. Recall the three
categories of consumers: physicians, patients, third-party payors.
Prescribing physicians cannot make informed treatment decisions
without manufacturer-furnished information of how drugs
compare to their patented competitors, to generics and other
non-patented treatments, and to no treatment at all. Patients
might for some drugs be entitled to information not mediated
through their physicians, even though, as was mentioned, the
learned intermediary doctrine is undisturbed by a judicial stance
that manufacturers must provide information about comparative
effectiveness; judges need not jettison this traditional protector
of defense interests when they rule that the failure to provide
comparative information can result in a warning defect. Indeed,
the learned intermediary doctrine is worth remembering here:
courts decided that warning physicians rather than the patient
suffices to discharge the duty to warn not because patients are
too stupid to follow directions but in recognition of the vast
array of choices and tradeoffs that drugs present—an array that
has become much more vast since courts formed the doctrine

the FDA of State Tort Claims for Failure to Warn on Pharmaceutical
Labeling, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 763, 780-86 (2006) (arguing that the FDA’s
effort violates an executive order, reflects unsound policymaking, and is
entitled to no Chevron deference because it is in effect an advisory opinion).
108
See, e.g., Mich. Stat. Ann. § 600.2946 (5) (Michie 2007) (enacted
1995) (providing that, absent fraud or bribery, FDA approval preempts
common law warning and design claims).
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decades ago. 109
It also bears mention that under the law of informed consent,
a physician must “inform the patient of a drug’s benefits and
dangers (as well as the benefits and dangers of no treatment and
alternative treatments).” 110 If such information about how a drug
performs is integral to the practice of medicine, then it is
equally integral to the proper marketing of this type of product.
Indeed, the medical-malpractice concept of informed consent
relates closely to the products-liability concept of informed
choice. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability coreporter Aaron D. Twerski has argued in work co-authored with
Neil B. Cohen that physicians should be obliged to tell their
patients not only about alternative treatments but alternative
providers. 111 In other words, when the physician or a managedcare defendant knows that other physicians have a better track
record in performing the service in question, failure to so inform
the patient is a violation of the duty to obtain informed consent.
This contention, though still unfamiliar, has support in case
law. 112
By denying that patients need to receive direct warnings
about most types of drugs, the learned intermediary doctrine
opens several realistic avenues to encourage the furnishing of
comparative information. The Avorn warning on a patient insert
becomes less necessary when “learned intermediaries” possess
basic data about the drug in its market. Just as physicians are
109

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 6 cmt. b
(1998); Larkin v. Pfizer, Inc., 153 S.W. 3d 758, 763-64 (Ky. 2004)
(summarizing rationales for the doctrine).
110
Owen, supra note 8, at 608-09.
111
Aaron D. Twerski & Neil B. Cohen, The Second Revolution in
Informed Consent: Comparing Physicians to Each Other, 94 NW. U. L. REV.
1, 24 (1999); Aaron D. Twerski & Neil B. Cohen, Comparing Medical
Providers: A First Look at the New Era of Medical Statistics, 58 BROOK. L.
REV. 5, 13 (1992).
112
Johnson v. Kokemoor, 545 N.W. 2d 495 (Wis. 1996) (holding, in an
informed consent case, that comparative mortality and morbidity data about
the surgeon-defendant were properly admitted at trial); DeGennaro v.
Tandon, 873 A.2d 191 (Conn. App. 2005) (holding that the defendant had an
obligation to disclose her relative lack of experience).
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presumed to be learned about the patient’s needs, so too might
third-party payors be deemed the correct recipients of
information about comparative effectiveness.
B. Fine-Tune § 6(c) of the Third Restatement
In their Section 6(c), about design-defect liability for
prescription drugs, the reporters of Restatement (Third) of Torts:
Products Liability wrote provocative new blackletter that did not
pretend to restate what courts were doing, except in its bottom
line on which side ought to prevail. 113 Judges have always been
hostile to claims that prescription drugs are defective in design,
and the Restatement continues this posture of rejection. The
novelty of the “unusual, to say the least” 114 rule in § 6(c) is its
unique rejectionist path: a drug is defective in design only if a
reasonably informed health-care provider, “knowing of its
foreseeable risks and therapeutic benefits, would not
prescribe . . . [it to] any class of patients.” 115 Traditionally
courts would reach the same answer with reference to the muchmaligned comment k of the Second Restatement, which had
deemed prescription drugs “unavoidably unsafe” and hence not
defective as a matter of law.
The test for defectiveness that the Third Restatement,
comment k, and the judicial consensus all reject for prescription
drugs is the one that governs design-defect claims about products
that are not prescription drugs: risk-utility balancing (at a macro
level) or the possibility that a plaintiff can prevail by presenting
a better alternative design. Neither of these analytic devices is
available to plaintiffs in drug-design cases: a plaintiff cannot
113

While the Restatement was in draft form, one commentator observed
that “no published decision proffers the ‘reasonable physician’ or ‘reasonable
health care provider’ as a legal test for determining whether or not the drug
or prescription device in question is unavoidably unsafe.” Jeffrey D.
Winchester, Section 8(c) of the Proposed Restatement (Third) of Torts: Is It
Really What the Doctor Ordered?, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 644, 670-71 (1997).
114
Owen, supra note 8, at 556.
115
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 6(c)
(1998).
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prevail by showing that a drug as designed does more harm than
good in the aggregate. Nor can claimants bring to court
proposed chemical reformulations that engineer out the dangers
they have identified. “Drug designs are different,” intoned the
reporters. 116 Indeed. Because physicians oversee distribution,
this product—unlike most other products, which a user can buy
and consume without pre-clearance—can go to individuals who
can benefit from it and kept from those who would be hurt by
its danger. Only when no benefited cohort exists is the design
bad; almost every drug that injures a plaintiff could help heal
another person, and so the failure lies not in design but in
distribution.
So far, so good: yet a departure from risk-utility assessment
this radical still favors pharmaceutical defendants in contrast to
all other manufacturing defendants, and the fact that
pharmaceutical defendants had to climb regulatory hurdles may
not be enough reason to protect them this much. Courts enjoy a
chance to modify the radicalism of § 6(c) by paying heed to the
Traynorian heritage. Although the central “drugs are different”
contention remains sound, when not construed carefully § 6(c)
achieves little beyond protection for the industry via a slammed
courthouse door.
A few suggestions pertinent to a Restatement § 6(c)-based
motion for summary judgment in response to a design-defect
claim:
(1) Compel the manufacturer, rather than the plaintiff, to
identify the § 6(c) “class of patients” in order to prevail on
summary judgment. The “class of patients” criterion of § 6(c)
overtly states, in blackletter, the relevance of effectiveness to
personal-injury litigation. Because effectiveness is so central to §
6(c), courts that accept this rule of this section can justifiably
use the burden of production to help achieve it. In commentary,
the Restatement implies that the plaintiff holds the obligation to
persuade on the “no class of patients” point, 117 but it is wrong
116

See supra note 33.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 6 (1998)
cmt. f (“Given this very demanding objective standard, liability is likely to be
imposed only under unusual circumstances. The court has the responsibility
117
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to saddle a plaintiff with this burden after she has identified a
flaw in the design of the drug, proposed the rudiments of a
feasible alternative, and shown that the design caused her injury.
Manufacturers instead should have to identify the class of
patients that would benefit from its challenged design.
Notwithstanding dicta in one case that rejected § 6(c) for its
state (on the ground that it is “too strict” 118 ), a mere assertion
by “the defense’s expert witness that the drug at issue had some
benefit for any single class of people” 119 should not suffice for
summary judgment. Expert testimony on the point should be
open to Daubert scrutiny. 120
The reasons to put this burden on defendants rather than on
plaintiffs are comprehensive. Defendants will typically know
who would benefit from their drugs as designed, whereas
plaintiffs would have to go to expense and trouble to support
their contention that no such class of patients exists. The
defendant’s task of identifying one benefited class is much easier
than the plaintiff’s task of showing that no such class exists.
Imposing this cost on defendants would lower the cost of
bringing valuable information to public light.
Second, consistent with other burden-shifting doctrines in
tort law, this category of plaintiff has demonstrated her
exceptional status among plaintiffs. She can benefit from the
burden-shifting rule only after demonstrating that the product in
question either fails in a macro-balance inquiry or should be
replaced by a feasible alternative design. 121
Perhaps the most salubrious effect of this rule is its
to determine when the plaintiff has introduced sufficient evidence so that
reasonable persons could conclude that plaintiff has met this demanding
standard.”).
118
Freeman v. Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc., 618 N.W. 2d 827, 840 (Neb.
2000).
119
Id.
120
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
121
Cf. Susan Epstein, Tort Reform to Ensure the Inclusion of Fertile
Women in Early Phases of Commercial Drug Research, 3 U. CHI. L. SCH.
ROUNDTABLE 355 (1996) (defending a burden-shifting proposal to favor
plaintiffs in litigation against drug manufacturers with reference to criteria
courts have used to support this shift).
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propensity to generate (not just reveal) more information.
Scholars have shown that current law encourages a manufacturer
of risky or toxic products to stick its corporate head in the sand,
choosing lack of knowledge over knowledge in order to benefit
from a lower standard of care. 122 With the “class of patients”
burden put on defendants, however, the manufacturer prospers
by doing the post-marketing studies that the FDA does not now
demand. 123 Even if the number of plaintiffs bringing design
defect claims remains relatively low notwithstanding this easing
of their obligations, manufacturers would, out of prudence, be
prepared to describe the class of patients to whom a reasonable
provider would prescribe their products. The preparation of such
information offers social utility at a relatively cheap price.
(2) Demand information about the § 6(c) “class of patients”
beyond the fact that such a class exists. Consumers would
benefit from more information about which groups of patients
benefit from a particular drug. The cohorts that pharmaceutical
interventions address are not generally known. Which groups
have relevant traits in common? Why are they well positioned to
benefit from a particular drug? How did researchers learn about
the effects on this group? Who isn’t benefiting? Litigation offers
unique opportunities to enhance transparency about marketing
practices. At present, manufacturers are prohibited from
suggesting in their advertisements that physicians make
therapeutic use of a drug for a purpose that the FDA has not
approved, but if they stop short of overt advertisement, in
practice they enjoy latitude to promote these unapproved
122

Wendy E. Wagner, Choosing Ignorance in the Manufacture of Toxic
Products, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 773 (1997). See also Margaret A. Berger,
Eliminating General Causation: Notes Toward a New Theory of Justice and
Toxic Torts, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2117, 2138-39 (1997) (noting that even if a
manufacturer can expect to be found liable for harm its toxic product caused,
the costs of this liability are remote and contingent, whereas the cost of
researching present dangers arrives immediately).
123
Wagner, supra note 122, at 833-48. While this Article was going to
press, the United States Senate passed a bill expanding FDA oversight over
drugs post-approval. Commentators expressed confidence that the measure
would become law. Heading Toward Reform of the FDA, N.Y. TIMES, May
11, 2007, at A26 (noting overwhelming 93-1 “veto-proof majority” vote).
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applications.
Much discreet, unreviewable promoting takes place behind
closed doors in medical offices. In one familiar scenario, an
attractive young saleswoman working on commission, successor
to the “detail man” of yore, totes sample pills and corporateembossed trinkets (and often an expense account to pay for
meals) when she visits a physician to suggest expanded patient
demographics for her brand-name product.124 Some observers
who do not receive these freebies have wanted to know more
about the promotional script, but their suggestions that the FDA
(or another regulator like the Securities and Exchange
Commission) monitor more closely what drug companies spend
on promotions and what usages their agents recommend have not
been heeded. Trial judges, who lack authority to produce the
information-fostering rules that regulators have declined to
write, can nevertheless encourage the production of information
by reading § 6(c) as an expansive rather than a narrow standard.
They can withhold summary judgment and send drug-design
claims to the jury when a manufacturer does not furnish full
information about the class of patients that benefit from the
challenged design.
(3) For § 6(c) purposes, courts should welcome evidence of
“off-label” practices. Continuing the expansiveness theme, “offlabel” uses should be available to litigants and courts that seek
124

One physician has confessed that he enjoys the company of “pharma
babes” in his office:
On the record, most docs will say reps are just a minor
distraction, that as professionals “we do our learning the oldfashioned way.” The cheap pens and pads adorned with logos
and drug names and the occasional steak dinners are supposed to
mean nothing to us. But 10 minutes of rapt attention from a
smiling beauty is still 10 minutes more than usual. So what if
she’s talking about nausea, vomiting, and diarrhea–we talk about
that stuff too. . . . I eavesdropped on the medical marketing
world when I repped medical devices for a summer job in
college—the reps knew what suckers doctors were and taught me
to take advantage of the fact. It hasn’t changed; just grab hold of
that inflated medical ego and twist—over we go.
Scott Haig, Attack of the Pharma Babes, TIME, Jan. 2, 2007.
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the class of patients to which a reasonably informed provider
would give the drug as designed. “Off-label,” a bit of industry
jargon, refers to uses and indications that are not named in the
labeling and packaging that the FDA approves when it permits a
manufacturer to market a prescription drug. Physicians who
prescribe a pharmaceutical product to treat a condition are not
bound by the indications for which the FDA approved the drug,
and can dispense it to any patient. 125
One category of drug now used much more often off-label
than on- is tricyclic antidepressants, mentioned above, one of the
earliest FDA-approved treatments for depression. Providers now
seldom dispense them for this purpose. The tricyclic design
might now be defective in terms of its officially sanctioned
purpose, then, because it is unsafe and ineffective when viewed
in relation to alternatives for its approved use. Yet a reasonably
informed provider would consider prescribing tricyclic
antidepressants for several classes of patients—persons suffering
from bulimia, cystitis, irritable bowel syndrome, even persistent
hiccups 126 —and so a plaintiff bringing a design-defect claim
ought to lose with reference to these off-label uses.
More clarity in the law of evidence could bolster the offlabel concept and make it cheaper to administer in court. For
example, courts could recognize expertise in off-label
dispensation as distinct from whether a reasonable physician
would dispense a drug off-label to a particular patient and
accordingly allow non-physician witnesses to testify, or perhaps
be allowed to admit what is now characterized as hearsay,
thereby lowering expert-witness costs for litigants. Live
testimony might be required only in unusual circumstances. Like
the other suggestions just made, this recognition of off-label
prescribing furthers the goal of fostering information by
encouraging candor and transparency about what prescribers are
125

The exceptions among prescription drugs are “controlled substances”
like opiates, whose distribution the Drug Enforcement Agency monitors
closely, with an eye toward reducing the dangers of addiction. See 21 U.S.C.
§ 801 et seq. (2004).
126
MARTINDALE: THE COMPLETE DRUG REFERENCE (33d ed.) (Sean
Sweetman ed., 2002).
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doing with this product.
For good or ill—probably, on the whole, for good—off-label
uses of prescription drugs have begotten a trove of new
therapies. 127 Cancer patients today are seldom restricted to the
four corners of FDA-approved uses for a drug, especially when
their physicians believe they are running out of time. 128 One
famous prescription drug, Viagra, would not have been
developed and patented as a treatment for erectile dysfunction if
its manufacturer had not noted the side effect that subjects
reported when they used an angina drug under study; 129 the
cardiac use for which Pfizer intended to seek on-label approval
never reached the market. American patients have been enlisted
in a massive uncontrolled experiment in off-label dispensation
that has helped and hurt them to an extent regulators do not
measure. Evidence-law reform could encourage the publication
of more off-label experience—both good and bad—and bring to
light data that the industry possesses and now shares only
selectively.
C. Punitive Damages and Effectiveness
In the hymnal that is the consensus about personal-injury law
as over-deterring drug manufacturers from bringing products to
the market, the song about the evil of punitive damages is
particularly oft-sung. Many statutes, both proposed and enacted,
that strive to improve either punitive damages law or
pharmaceutical law or both eliminate this form of damages in
actions for injury attributed to an FDA-approved drug. 130 The
leading piece of decisional law on the poor fit between punitive
127

See Klein & Tabarrok, supra note 41.
Bernadette Tansey, Why Doctors Prescribe Off Label, S.F. CHRON.,
May 1, 2005, at A12.
129
Klein & Tabarrok, supra note 41.
130
See, e.g., Help Efficient, Accessible, Low-cost, Timely Healthcare
(HEALTH) Act of 2003, H.R. 5, 108th Cong. (introduced 2003) at 7; Ariz.
Rev. Stat. Ann. 12-701 (2004); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 2307.80 (C)(1) (2005).
New Jersey, N.J. Stat. Ann. 2A:58C-5(c) (West 1987); Oregon, Or. Rev.
Stat. 30.927 (2000); Utah Code Ann. 78-18-2 (Michie 2004).
128
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damages and products liability arose from litigation about a
cholesterol-lowering drug. 131
As with drug litigation generally, critics of liability cannot
point to defeats in court as a reason for reform—only their lack
of a guarantee that such defeats could never happen. One
leading critic, Kip Viscusi, who concedes that courts almost
never award punitive damages in personal-injury drug litigation
unless a manufacturer has in effect lied to the FDA—
withholding or rewriting material negative information about its
product 132 —nevertheless insists that the industry should receive
more shelter from “litigation uncertainty” in the form of
stringent punitive-damages reform. 133 Unless the industry badly
needs more protection from the dreaded forces of overdeterrence
(a need it has never demonstrated), 134 the opposite conclusion
seems more warranted by the record, with its absence of actual
awards for anything other than fraud on the regulatory
authorities.
Adding effectiveness to the punitive damages matrix could
raise the number of cases that impose punitive damages on drug
manufacturers while remaining sensitive to the concern about
over-deterring product development. As practiced, punitive
damages for this category of litigation identify the American
public rather than individual litigants as the victims of
wrongdoing. 135 The plaintiff’s role as private attorney general,
doing the work of regulators, emerges more clearly than in
131

Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 832 (2d Cir.
1967) (Friendly, J.).
132
Viscusi, supra note 24, at 1476 n.41.
133
Id. at 1476-77.
134
JUDITH P. SWAZEY, Prescription Drug Safety and Product Liability,
in THE LIABILITY MAZE: THE IMPACT OF LIABILITY LAW ON SAFETY AND
INNOVATION 295-96 (Peter W. Huber & Robert E. Litan eds., 1991)
(observing that drug manufacturers have the data to demonstrate the adverse
effects of liability but have never used these facts to document the reform
proposals they advocate).
135
Here I am influenced by, but do not hew to, Catherine M. Sharkey,
Punitive Damages as Societal Damages, 113 YALE L.J. 347, 389 (2003)
(contemplating payouts to recipients who were not parties to originally filed
claims).
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personal injury litigation not involving regulated industries,
where the particulars of the plaintiff create a basis for
punishment. In drug litigation, by contrast, the plaintiff has
helped the government do its safety work. Punitive damages for
this type of injury serve to reward plaintiffs for detecting and
then deterring misinformation about dangers that thwarted the
FDA safety mission. Similarly, then, plaintiffs could be
rewarded for detecting and deterring misinformation that
thwarted the FDA effectiveness mission.
The suggestion here is that a subset of plaintiffs with good
claims for drug-caused injury be allowed to collect punitive
damages for the societal wrong of selling a prescription drug
that is not effective, just as a subset now can collect such
damages for the societal wrong of selling an unsafe prescription
drug. Criteria for punitive damages would include an injury to
the plaintiff caused by the drug, a showing that the drug was not
effective and, again to retain a connection to current punitivedamages traditions, proof that in its FDA new drug application
the manufacturer withheld or misstated information about this
lack of effectiveness. Other restrictive criteria might be added, if
these prove too generous to plaintiffs.
This approach to punitive damages requires a court to agree
that consumers are injured by ineffectiveness; it must reject
metaphors of unbarking dogs and non-firing guns. 136 Once
courts recognize the reality of injury, they become freer to
award punitive damages in the right measure. This opportunity
grows particularly valuable in this post-State Farm era, now that
the Supreme Court has repeatedly declared that punitive
damages in an amount too many times larger than the
compensatory award may violate a defendant’s due process
rights. 137 The baseline of safety-related harm is the value of
physical injury that the plaintiff suffered, and courts in the
future might well hold that a plaintiff bringing a safety-related
claim may not collect more than a single-digit multiple of that
136

See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 424-45
(2003); Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, 532 U.S. 424, 44142 (2001); BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 581 (1996)
137
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sum. Because ineffectiveness-related harm is less determinate—
and affects third-party payors and physicians, not just patients—
the maximum award for punitive damages can enlarge. 138
Steps toward expanding punitive damages should not be
taken lightly: courts need to keep overdeterrence in mind. If
drug manufacturers are now unduly threatened and hampered by
liability, then more punitive damages for drug claims becomes a
problem rather than a solution. Yet to a judge seeking to apply
the law, principles of legislative supremacy are at least as
worthy of attention as a lament about too much liability. At the
state level, legislatures that have not banned punitive damages in
drug cases have manifested a tacit choice to permit them. 139 The
large majority of states that have not adopted a regulatory
compliance defense have declared that FDA approval of a drug
is a floor, or minimum, rather than an upper limit on liability.
At the national level, Congress saw fit (in a unanimous vote) to
prohibit the sale of any drug for which there is no substantial
evidence of effectiveness, and has not amended the Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act to discourage personal injury litigation with
express preemption, a regulatory compliance defense, or a ban
on punitive damages—all choices that it had the authority to
make. It is reasonable to infer that legislatures support the
expansion of punitive damages for deceiving the FDA on
effectiveness.
As for the policy effects of punitive damages, judges should
138

When this Article went to press, published case law in the wake of
Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057 (2007) had just barely
begun to appear. In Williams, a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court reversed a
judgment of $79 million in punitive damages on the ground that this sum had
reflected recognition of injuries to persons who were not parties to the action.
Much rides on whether Williams stands for the proposition that very large
punitive damage awards violate the Due Process Clause simply by their size
and indeterminancy. Should its reach prove more modest in operation, then
the understanding of ineffectiveness as a distinct source of personal injury
becomes vital for the force of this measure following its constitutionalization
post-1996.
139
See Schwartz & Goldberg, supra note 4, at 175-76 (pointing out, by
naming only a few states, that the majority of United States legislatures do
not single out drug cases as less deserving of punitive damages).
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bear in mind the distinction between effectiveness and efficacy.
Mere failure to attain clinical improvement in patients does not
violate the post-1962 mandate that a drug must be effective. The
job of a drug is to live up to the promises on its label. Telling
the truth about what the drug will do, then, would insulate a
manufacturer from punitive damages.
“No it won’t,” a spokesperson for the industry might retort.
“One runaway jury misreading a label, and our multimilliondollar investment in development is done for.” Anti-liability
partisans might envision a badly injured sympathetic plaintiff—
perhaps a child injured in utero—serving as the compensatory
base, with punitive damages fancifully extracted by misreading
of a label.
Such worries lack foundation. Heart-tugging plaintiffs have
enjoyed whatever powers they have held for years; they are
unaddressed in this Article. The power identified by expanded
liability comes from authoritative yet dishonest words. A
plaintiff’s lawyer could win punitive damages only by showing
that promises about clinical effects were false by design. This
verbal, text-based contention is rooted in contract, and breach of
a written contract is inherently cooler, less manipulative, and
less inflammatory than a claim of personal injury attributed to
wrongful action.
CONCLUSION
After many years of criticism about its over-deterrent effects,
prescription drug liability has become stagnant. Legislation, case
law, and scholarship, all sharing their worry about reducing the
supply of prescription drugs, dampened the fiery old conviction
that products liability enhances consumer welfare. In a literature
now deficient in balance, writers propose few suggestions for
reform beyond liability-squelching.
The result is a sorry circle. Daunted by anti-liability rhetoric
that is among other things an attack on their work product,
judges feel they can achieve less through the imposition of
liability. When courts do less with liability, liability comes to
have fewer effects. When liability has fewer effects, it does less
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observable good, and becomes both harder to embrace and
easier to decry for its hypothetical power to wreck an industry.
The circle is complete when these attacks daunt the judiciary.
No surprise, then, that personal-injury liability for defective
drugs has achieved little to improve welfare since the heady days
when it blasted the Dalkon Shield out of the market and sent a
strong consumer-protection message.
This outcome would be acceptable, even desirable, if liability
really hurts rather than helps the public. Prescription-drug
liability probably offers both overdeterrence and underdeterrence, however. Although the persons who manage
manufacturers undoubtedly feel apprehensive about the
possibility of paying ruinous damages to litigious victims, 140 and
the industry has suffered unjustly on occasion in court, 141 the
pharmaceutical sector has also been prospering at the expense of
consumers. Numerous commentators have decried them for
producing and selling unsafe drugs. Less well-documented in the
courts and in law reviews, but at the center of this Article, is the
fact that this industry also produces and profits from ineffective
and inefficacious drugs.
Lack of safety and lack of effectiveness both violate a
popular, uncontroversial, established-for-decades statutory
mandate. Regarding safety claims, participants in and observers
of the drug-liability system accept that the Food and Drug
140

See supra note 21.
Bendectin is widely believed to be a martyr drug. See generally
GREEN, supra note 3 (describing Bendectin as a poster child of courts driving
away a valuable drug). One critic of liability argues that two intrauterine
devices, the Copper-7 and Lippes Loop, were also martyred following the
well-deserved demise of the Dalkon Shield. PETER W. HUBER, LIABILITY:
THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 41-42 (1988). In response
to Huber in particular, defenders of liability have retorted that when the
disappearance of a particular drug results from poor marketing, disappointing
profits, or perhaps even a desire to flounce away from the market to express
pique about the existence of liability, its manufacturer will naturally prefer to
blame what it could not control. Jeff L. Lewin, Calabresi’s Revenge? Junk
Science in the Work of Peter Huber, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 283, 297 (1992)
(reviewing Huber’s Galileo’s Revenge); Joseph A. Page, Deforming Tort
Reform, 78 GEO. L.J. 649, 685-89 (1990) (reviewing Huber’s Liability).
141
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Administration will not detect every safety-related flaw in
advance of approval, and they agree that litigation ex post
functions as a means to remedy this deficiency (some like this
litigation; some don’t). The same reasoning suggests that
litigation ex post is also a means (some will like this litigation;
some won’t) to remedy the deficiency in effectiveness.
True, the harm of an ineffective drug is harder to see than
the harm of an unsafe one, and when harm is not seen, personalinjury litigation appears beside the point. It is not. Safety and
effectiveness are related conditions that cannot be understood in
isolation from each other. Lack of effectiveness is central to lack
of safety. Without the possibility of good results, even small
risks are unjustified. Without alignment between label-promises
and outcomes, the perils of deceit, wrongfully gained revenue,
and emotional distress loom large. Without therapeutic benefit
from a product (putting aside for this purpose the small
percentage of prescription drugs that give consumers things they
do not need to sustain their life or health, such as sexual
enhancements or new hair growth), a patient remains in danger.
Lack of effectiveness in a drug causes plenty of harm. A subset
of injured persons ought to find relief in the courts for this
injury.
In conclusion, recall overdeterrence—both its reality and its
specter. So long as legislators and commentators continue to site
the problem of supply incentives at the heart of prescriptiondrug liability, judges cannot, and should not, abandon their
present concern about over-wielding the liability sanction.
Accordingly, the specific suggestions to them offered in this
Article take only modest first steps. 142 In the event of a future
revised consensus that what vexes the prescription drug market
is too little deterrence rather than too much—the belief that
launched strict products liability around the time that the 1962
drug amendments were enacted—stronger reforms than those
proposed here could be written: for example, courts could
bolster the qui tam action to augment rewards for bringing

142

See supra n.28 and Part III.
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ineffectiveness to public light, 143 and courts and legislatures
could encourage class actions that allege deception by drug
manufacturers. 144 Meanwhile, policy-minded judges mindful of
the importance of supply must also bear in mind that each drug
on the American market wrapped in false promises of
therapeutic gain violates a law-based entitlement to
effectiveness. 145 This wrong ought to imply a right.

143

For example, federal courts could bolster the qui tam action by
allowing a person who knows that an FDA-approved drug is not effective to
invoke the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (2005). This statute allows
for treble damages and provides that the initiator, called the realtor, collects
between 15 and 30 percent of any recovery if the action succeeds. 31 U.S.C.
§ 3730(d)(1) (2005). Qui tam helped bring down overpromotion and other
misconduct related to the epilepsy drug Neurontin. See supra note 15; Ralph
F. Hall & Robert J. Berlin, When You Have a Hammer Everything Looks
Like a Nail: Misapplication of the False Claims Act to Off-Label Promotion,
61 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 653, 662-63 (2006) (noting that the realtor, a
physician named David Franklin, recovered $27 million for his Neurontin
work). For a qui tam reform proposal focusing on drug safety, see Catherine
T. Struve, The FDA and the Tort System: Postmarketing Surveillance,
Compensation, and the Role of Litigation, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. &
ETHICS 587 (2005). State courts, for their part, could become more
welcoming to deceptive-trade practices actions.
144
See supra note 37 (observing that at present, many courts appear to
favor discouragement).
145
In addition to imposing an extraordinarily high effectiveness hurdle
for new-drug approval, the 1962 amendments to the Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act took an intolerant view of existing approved drugs. These
drugs benefited surprisingly little from “grandfathering” or a presumption of
effectiveness, and in the 1960s the FDA put them through controlled studies
to see how well they measured up to the claims on their labels. See supra
note 53; PETER BARTON HUTT & RICHARD MERRILL, FOOD AND DRUG LAW:
CASES AND MATERIALS 478 (2d ed. 1991).

